



VIRTUAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

VICTORIA PER INTELLECTUM

OPAR 2 VIS – D0 INTSUM + Targeting Presentation





Current Enemy Situation - Ground

- The Syrian 1st Corps are observed to be well within Turkish territory, encamped both around the Birecik Dam and at Gazientep Airfield.
- Division HQ's (unidentified, believed 11th Mech Div.) have been reported at Gazientep Airfield.
- A Division HQ (believed 12th Motor Div.) was reported East of the Birecik Dam, supported by manoeuvre units North East of the Dam; several armoured columns supported by mobile SAM were reported.
- A Corp HQ and division strength Armoured units were reported at Minakh airbase. It was not possible to determine whether this is the 1st or 2nd Corps HQ, although based on other intelligence it is assessed as 1st Corps.
- No assessment has yet been made of the Syrian 3rd, 4th or 5th Corps.





Current Enemy Situation - Ground

- Several motorized battalions have been observed in the area immediately north-east of the Birecik Dam.
- These are estimated as being battalion sized groups, accompanied predominantly by SA-8. These represent the 'softest' targets identified so far.





Current Enemy Situation - Air

- Syrian CAP appears to be limited and no SWEEP or OCA sorties were conducted by Syrian forces on D0.
- Intelligence suggests that CAP is limited to two-ships, with multiple flights undertaking duties on rotation.
- Station time for CAP is reported to be between 20 and 40 minutes, with airborne flights conducting hasty returns to base (580+ GS reported).
- Gaps were reported in Syrian CAP coverage, likely owing to a low number of high readiness aircraft available.
- The axis, position and pattern of CAP was not consistent and assessed by C2 as being 'random'.





Current Enemy Situation - IADS

- The IADS system appears to be fully operational, although intelligence is lacking on radar capabilities south of a line E/W through Abu al-Duhur (N35 44.000).
- This lack of intelligence inhibits analysis of the vulnerability of SCC control IADS West; a perceived priority for creating a permissive environment for air operations
- Sborka radars appear to be well distributed both along and north of the Turkish border and are likely to be supplementing the IADS picture.
- Significant concentrations of strategic and low-level SAMs have ben identified at Minakh (1st Corp) and Gazientep and it is assessed that a similar concentration will be present at Taftanaz (2nd Corps).





Current Enemy Situation - Navy

- The Syrian Navy appears to be uninvolved in the conflict in the North at this time.
- Two ships were identified within Syrian territorial waters south of a line E/W through Abu al-Dahur AB (N35 44.0) and appear to pose no immediate threat.
- No pattern of life has been identified for these vessels as of yet further intelligence submissions are welcomed, but not assessed as being critical.





Current Enemy Situation – Logistics

- Small numbers of logistics vehicles operate directly in conjunction with mechanised and motorised battalions throughout the AO.
- An IL-76 was observed at Bassel Al-Assad airfield and is assessed as being Russian.
- A second IL-76 was observed landing at Minakh AB, assessed as being from the Syrian 801st Logistics Sqn.
- A number of utility helicopters were co-located at Minakh and it is assessed that these will be used for forward supply of both 1st and 2nd Corps units deployed at or across the Turkish border.





Current Enemy Situation – Other

• No SCUD activity was reported during our D0 observations.





Enemy Centre of Gravity

- VIS currently assesses the Syrian Armed Forces as the Centre of Gravity. This could be further subdivided and more targeted COG analysis undertaken of key elements.
- CVs for Syrian Armed Forces include
 - C2 the Syrian armed forces is strictly hierarchical and adhere to doctrine. Little scope is given for initiative by commanders in the field. Destruction of HQs and other C2 elements will have a temporary paralysing effect, gaining the initiative for friendly forces
 - Fuel only two storage facilities provide much of the armed forces fuel supply. Destruction of these will significantly complicate the provision of fuel to armed forces units in the medium term, reducing mobility and available AF sorties. Possible civilian impact.





Enemy Centre of Gravity

- VIS currently assesses the Syrian IADS as the current Centre of Gravity
 - The IADS network currently provides the greatest capability to fight to the Syrian armed forces, as this poses the most direct threat to friendly forces operating in the AO.
 - It is assessed that the disruption or destruction of even small parts of the IADS will greatly enable more aggressive air sorties against Syrian forces, thus enabling GFC to meet their objectives with air support.





Enemy Courses of Action

- At this early stage, it is challenging to provide clear assessment of courses of action, as little 'pattern of life' intelligence has yet been obtained.
- It is currently assessed that the Most Likely COA and the Most Dangerous COA are the same:
- It is considered likely that the Syrian 2nd Corps will cross the Turkish border to the south-west of Hatay and aggressively push north, seizing ground up to and including Iskenderun.
- Doing so prevents encircling manoeuvres being attempted against the Syrian 1st Corps, whilst providing access to high terrain which would facilitate artillery/MLRS attacks of Incirlik airbase.





Enemy High Value Targets

- A full list of theatre targets is provided by VID and available at OPAR BRIEF.
- VIS assess that the following targets are high priority:
 - SYTGT069 SCC WEST
 - Syrian 1st Corps HQ located at Gaziantep Intl. Airport
 - Syrian forces amassed at Gaziantep Intl. Airport
 - Sborka and other long-range search radars positioned on or near the Turkish border with Syria





Intelligence Requirements

Intelligence is critically required in the following areas:

- IVO the Turkish border immediately east and south of Hatay it is possible that Syrian forces may have already crossed the border.
- Taftanaz AB It is critical that we locate the Syrian 2nd Corps HQ and identify what assets remain stationed at the HQ.
- Strategic SAM locations VIS has only received reports of a small number of SA-6 and SA-11.
- Search/Early Warning Radar locations throughout the AO.
- 11th Mechanised/12th Motorised division SHORAD unit locations approximately half of the SHORAD units expected around the Birecik Dam were reported





Recommended TSTs

- STRATEGIC SAMs covering 1st/2nd Corps (SA-6, SA-11), where friendly security is not at significant risk
- Syrian WMD SCUD launchers, transport or storage facilities
- **C2 Infrastructure** Corps/Division HQs that are vulnerable; mobile C2 units, AWACS etc, where friendly security is not at significant risk





Short Term Recommendations for Targeting

Based on the disposition of Syrian forces, VIS recommends the following:

- The 12th Motorised Division, occupying the Birecik Dam.
 - These forces lack significant strategic SAM coverage and are not assessed as being at full divisional strength in the immediate vicinity of the Dam.
- Sborka and other Search/Early warning assets along the Syrian border with Turkey
- Syrian 2nd Corps resources immediately South of Hatay.



Long Term Recommendations for Targeting

Phase 1:

- Strategic SAMs attached to 1st/2nd Corps (SA-6, -11) to permit friendly air operations by slow-moving aircraft
- 1st Corp HQ and division HQs to prevent/delay further Syrian attack, giving friendly forces initiative
- Rocket artillery regiments/battalions, to reduce risk to our ground forces and Turkish civilians
- Degrade IADS in West and East sectors. *If possible,* work towards destroying the SCCs as this will leave the remaining IADS more vulnerable
- Other LCC priorities as identified
- Consider deploying observation units to watch main N/S highway and/or SCUD bases

Phase 2:

- Further degradation of IADS to secure air superiority over parts of Syria and later throughout Syria
- Conduct attacks against Syrian WMD infrastructure, including TELs
- Attacks on airbases to secure air superiority over parts of Syria and later throughout Syria
- Other LCC priorities as identified

Phase 3:

• Attacks on further military infrastructure targets and industrial targets to delay recovery of offensive capability